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The Unitary Tax Method: Are the
Factors Used by California in the
Determination of Unity Still
Viable After ASARCO and
Woolworth?
A question of constitutional law that has long been settled is that a
state can tax the income of a corporation engaged in business within
the taxing state.' Indeed, most states now levy a tax either on, or mea-
sured by, corporate income.2 For those corporations that confine their
business activity to one state, traditional separate accounting methods3
can be relied upon to produce a sufficiently accurate measurement of
income for state taxation purposes.
When a corporate taxpayer is doing business both in and out of the
taxing state, however, this income measurement problem becomes diffi-
cult. Corporations conducting interstate business, including both mul-
tistate and multinational operations, are referred to as
multijurisdictional corporations.' Under traditional separate account-
ing concepts, the income from a business transaction can be conclu-
sively determined only upon the completion of the transaction.' The
problem that a state faces in relying upon the separate accounting
method for the purpose of taxing a multijurisdictional corporation cen-
ters around what are called "transfer prices."7 Transfer prices are the
1. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); Seago, The Revitalization of the
Unitary Business Principle-.4SARCO and Woolworth, 1 J. OF ST. TAX'N 101, 102 (Summer 1980).
2. H. FRENTZ, 1982 CALIFORNIA TAX HANDBOOK 474 (1982).
3. Traditional separate accounting is the process of computing income by determining the
gross receipts of a business and subtracting the expenses incurred in earning those receipts. Kees-
ling, The Combined Report and Worldwide Businesses, 60 TAXES 304, 304 (1982).
4. Id.
5. Government Report 4ddresses Unitary Business Taxation, 43 ST. TAX REv. No. 32, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Government Report].
6. For example, if a company manufactures a product at a cost of $10 and then spends
another $5 in selling expenses to produce sales revenues of $20, there would clearly be income of
$5 from this business activity ($20 income less the total costs of $15). If an attempt is made to
determine the income produced by the manufacturing process alone, however, traditional ac-
counting is no longer infallible. The manufacturing would have contributed nothing to income
unless the later sale took place, but the sale could not have taken place without the item having
been manufactured in the first place. So where and when was the $5 of income earned? See
Seago, supra note 1, at 103-04.
7. See Keesling, supra note 3, at 305.
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theoretical or actual prices at which intracompany transactions8 take
place.' Unless these transfer prices used for internal bookkeeping pur-
poses approximate those which would occur in true arm's-length' °
transactions, the resulting income amount will not reflect the economic
reality of the transactions." Thus, under traditional separate account-
ing methods, a multijurisdictional corporation could manipulate the in-
come reported within California. By adjusting the transfer prices used
in the determination of corporate income,the corporation could show a
lower portion of total income as having been earned in that state.' 2
As a result, approximately forty-five states have created some appor-
tionment method, 3 generally referred to as "the unitary method."
These unitary tax methods determine the portion of a multijurisdic-
tional corporate taxpayer's income apportionable to each individual
state in which the corporation has activities.' 4 The tax computed on the
apportioned income of a multijurisdictional corporation is thus re-
ferred to as a unitary tax. The complexity of the accounting problems
encountered,' 5 the nonuniformity of the apportionment methods that
have been devised,' 6 and the importance of the constitutional issues
involved,'7 have combined to create numerous and intensive controver-
sies between the multijurisdictional corporations and the taxing
states."'8
Since the 1977-1978 term, the United States Supreme Court has ac-
cepted an increasing number of cases involving the federal constitu-
tional limits on state apportionment methods for taxing
multijurisdictional corporations.' 9 The federal constitutional aspects of
state income taxation include the privileges and immunities, due pro-
cess, commerce, and equal protection clauses.2 0 Many of the state uni-
tary tax cases involve concurrent challenges under both the due process
8. Intracompany transactions are business exchanges between (1) segments of one corpora-
tion or (2) two or more corporations that are part of an affiliated group of corporations. See id.
9. Cory, The Oil Companies' Disappearing Profits: A Case/or the Unitary Method, 12 TAX
NOTES 1137, 1138 (1981).
10. An arm's-length transaction is one made at the price that would prevail in a true market
transaction. Id. at 1137.
11. Id. at 1138.
12. Id.
13. Government Report, supra note 5, at 1.
14. See infra notes 111-72 and accompanying text.
15. See generaly Keesling, supra note 3 (for example, income allocation and the identifica-
tion of proper transfer prices).
16. See Corrigan, Uniformity in Interstate Taxation, 13 TAX NOTES 200, 200 (1981).
17. See infra notes 173-252 and accompanying text.
18. Government Report, supra note 5, at 1.
19. Hellerstein, Allocation and Apportionment ofDividends and the Delineation ofthe Unitary
Business, 14 TAX NOTES 155, 155 (1982).
20. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 282 (1978).
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and the commerce clauses.2" Significantly, in two 1982 landmark deci-
sions, ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission ,22 and F W Wool-
worth Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department,23 the
United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of a due
process analysis of the constitutionality of state formulary apportion-
ment methods. 4 In both of these decisions, the Court found that the
attempt by these states to tax foreign source25 income violated the due
process clause and thus there was no need to reach the taxpayers' com-
merce clause claims.26 The most recent review of a California unitary
tax decision by the United States Supreme Court was Container Corpo-
ration ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax Board, 27 decided on June 27, 1983.
The Supreme Court in Container Corp. found that the state had prop-
erly applied the unitary business concept in taxing the appellant, a mul-
tijurisdictional corporation. The Container Corp. decision, in addition
to dealing with the issue of unity, involved the more complicated issue
of whether proportional taxation of income earned outside of the
United States violates the commerce clause. Nevertheless, the Container
Corp. case serves as an excellent example of (1) the principles involved
in a due process analysis of the apportionment method of income taxa-
tion and (2) the attitude of the United States Supreme Court toward the
current controversies between taxing states and taxpayers. Accord-
ingly, this comment will focus on a due process analysis of the constitu-
tionality of the formulary apportionment method used by California
for taxing multijurisdictional corporations.
In addition to the emphasis placed upon due process considerations
in these recent apportionment cases, the United States Supreme Court
has declared that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state
income taxation is the unitary business principle."28 The Court has re-
iterated the vital role of this unitary business concept in all of the cur-
rent decisions regarding taxation of multijurisdictional corporations. 9
Therefore, this comment will examine the unitary business concept
from its inception in early property tax decisions to its current status as
21. Id. A state must have jurisdiction to tax in a substantive due process sense, however,
before there can be a question as to whether that tax imposes an improper burden on interstate
commerce. Id.
22. 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
23. 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).
24. See generallyASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3109; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3134.
25. Foreign in the sense that the income was earned outside of the taxing state's borders. See
ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3111-12; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3131-34.
26. See ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3116; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3139.
27. No. 81-523, slip op. (June 27, 1983), rev'g 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121.
28. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
29. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223 (1980); ASARCO, 102 S.
Ct. at 3110; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3134; Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip. op. at 4.
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the central and cohesive element in the recent controversies between
the multijurisdictional corporations and the taxing states in general,
and California in particular.
California applies the unitary tax method based on apportionment of
the income earned in interstate business by multijurisdictional corpora-
tions. 3° The resulting tax revenue is an important source of income for
this state.3 A meaningful examination of the effect thatASARCO and
Woolworth will have on the unitary tax method used by California
must begin with an understanding of the reasons why California
adopted an apportionment method for taxing these corporations, 32 as
well as the historical development of the current California unitary tax
approach.33 Following a brief description of the way in which the Cali-
fornia unitary tax is computed,34 and a comparison of the factors of
unitariness applied in ASARCO and Woolworth with those currently
used by the California tax authorities,35 this comment will discuss the
due process requirements involved36 in evaluating the constitutionality
of an apportionment method. This comment will conclude that the ap-
proach to apportionment in California will meet the due process chal-
lenge exemplified by ASARCO and Woolworth f certain adjustments
are made in that approach.37 The starting point in an analysis of the
constitutionality of the California unitary tax method is an understand-
ing of the method as currently applied by the state taxing authorities
and courts.
THE UNITARY TAX METHOD IN CALIFORNIA
The need for an apportionment method based on the unitary busi-
ness principle became apparent 38 upon enactment of the first California
corporate income tax and franchise tax laws.39 California was already
30. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 474-512; Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 3 (the
method has gained wide acceptance and one form of it is the basis for the Uniform Division of
Income for Tax Purposes Act, now substantially adopted by California and twenty-two other
states).
31. Church, Senator Church on Unitary Taxation, 11 TAX NOTEs 6, 6 (1980).
32. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 66-110 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 111-72 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 262-340 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 173-261 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
38. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 475.
39. See generally CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§23501-23572. In addition, California imposes a
franchise tax on corporations organized in California and foreign corporations doing business in
California. See generally id §§23101-23404. The Code defines "doing business for this purpose as
"actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit."
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §23101. For unitary tax purposes it is immaterial whether a corporation
is taxable under the income tax or under the franchise tax provisions. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at
489.
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popular as a distribution point for Eastern manufactuing concerns.40
These interstate businesses could, with comparative ease, structure and
price their intracompany transactions so that the California activity
showed little or no income.41
A. Necessity
Due to the rapid growth in both the size and the complexity of indi-
vidual business entities, many corporations have ceased to confine their
business activities to one state. Corporations continue to open branch
offices or incorporate subsidiaries42 within California as outlets to dis-
tribute and sell products that have been manufactured at plants located
in other parts of the country. Therefore, states like California have had
to find a method for separating the income of this type of a taxpayer
into that income earned outside of, and that income earned inside of,
the state. Two alternative methods are available:4 3 traditional separate
acccounting and the apportionment method.'
L The Traditional Separate Accounting Alternative
Traditional separate accounting,45 the application of commercial ac-
counting principles to determine the source of income, is satisfactory to
the state taxing authorities in those instances in which activities are car-
ried on both inside and outside of California if the business carried on
within the state is truly separate and distinct from the business outside
of the state.46 If the intrastate and extrastate activities are interdepen-
dent, however, accurate measurement of the taxable income generated
within the state by application of separate accounting principles is ex-
tremely difficult.47 The unitary business principle is based on the ra-
tionale that when the in-state portion of a business is interrelated with
the out-of-state portion of that business, the overall operations should
be taken into account in determining the amount of joint income that
should be taxed by the various states involved.4 For example, if a cor-
poration manufactures products in Nevada, but sells all of those prod-
ucts in California, the resulting "income" is earned in a series of
40. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 475.
41. Id
42. The principles governing the allocation of income of a unitary business are the same
whether that business is conducted by one corporation with divisions or by one corporation with
several subsidiaries. Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 183 P.2d 16,
21 (1947).
43. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text; Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 3.
44. Corrigan, Mobil-izing Interstate Taxation, 12 TAx NOTES 803, 808 (1981).
45. See supra note 3.
46. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE. §25101(a).
47. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
48. Corrigan, supra note 44, at 806.
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transactions beginning with the purchase of raw materials in Nevada
and culminating in the receipt of sales revenues in California. Each
state has conferred the benefit of allowing the corporation to do busi-
ness within the borders of that state, but each is faced with the impossi-
bility of specifically allocating the profits earned within that state. 9
This series of income-producing steps is thus viewed as a unit or as a
"unitary business. '50
The separate accounting method would account for a transaction of
this type by assigning a transfer price,5' presumably the price that
would prevail in a true market or arm's-length 52 transaction, to the
product at the time of transfer from the manufacturing state to the sell-
ing state. This theoretical or actual payment would then serve as a
"revenue" measurement in the Nevada manufacturing process and as a
"cost" measurement in the California sales process. 3 Thus, under the
separate accounting method, the income reported in a given state is
subject to manipulation by the corporate taxpayer, since that is the
party who establishes the transfer price.5 1 Multijurisdictional corpora-
tions, whether in the form of one large corporation with separate divi-
sions, or a parent corporation with multiple subsidiaries, can easily
avoid state income taxes by income shifting effected through the strate-
gic use of transfer prices.5 5 Nevertheless, opponents of the apportion-
ment method argue that the opportunity to manipulate transfer prices
is more than offset by (1) the internal and external pressures that oper-
ate to ensure that prices charged in intracorporate transfers are arm's-
length, 6 and (2) the relatively low level of state taxes.5 7
Manipulation of reported in-state income by multijurisdictional cor-
porations is not, however, the only problem that taxing states have with
the separate accounting method. Current use of the arm's-length
method by the Internal Revenue Service for taxing multinational cor-
porations has shown that this method creates an unacceptable level of
uncertainity, unreliability and administrative burden for both the Serv-
ice and the taxpayer.58 Additionally, application of the separate ac-
49. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920).
50. Seago, supra note 1, at 103.
51. Cory, supra note 9, at 1137 (the price that one division or corporate subsidiary of an
integrated company charges other divisions).
52. See supra note 10.
53. See Cory, supra note 9, at 1137-38.
54. Id
55. Id at 1137.
56. See supra note 10.
57. See generally Taggert, Arms Length Pricing and the Unitary Method, 11 TAX NOTES 177
(1980).
58. See The GO4 on IRSAdministration of Section 482, 13 TAx NOTES 877, 877 (1981) ("in
the modem economic system of multinational business, a true arm's length price can rarely be
identified"); Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 3.
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counting method to each corporation engaged in a unitary business has
been compared to "trying to determine which part of a baseball pitch-
er's body is the key to his success: by the same token, all parts of a
unitary business are vital to the overall profitability of the business.' ' 9
Faced with these inadequacies of the separate accounting method, Cal-
ifornia, among other states, has adopted the unitary method of appor-
tionment for taxing corporations with business activity in more than
one state.6 °
2. The Unitary Method ofApportionment
Several points favor the use of a unitary apportionment method to
allocate the total income earned by a multijurisdictional corporation
among the states in which that business is active. When a corporation's
business within the state and its business outside of the state are interre-
lated, an apportionment method of taxation conforms more equitably
to economic reality in distributing tax burdens.61 In addition, the ap-
portionment method precludes the use of separate accounting to en-
gage in tax avoidance or income shifting and eliminates the problem of
establishing theoretical arm's-length market prices when standard mar-
ket prices may not exist.62 Despite these points in favor of using an
apportionment method, many commentators continue to view the uni-
tary tax method as merely the better of two evils because the only alter-
native is the separate accounting method.63
The problem with the apportionment approach is the difficulty en-
countered in developing a method that will do what that method is
intended to do without violating the taxpayer's constitutional rights:
identify the real economic contribution that the business activity within
the state makes to the overall corporate unit and fairly allocate the re-
sulting total unitary income among the states involved.' 4 A brief re-
view of the evolution of the unitary tax method in California via
statutory and decisional law is a useful preliminary step in understand-
ing the current apportionment method used in this state. That history
therefore will be presented in the next section of this comment. 65
59. Corrigan, supra note 44, at 808.
60. Cory, supra note 9, at 1138.
61. Id
62. Government Report, supra note 5, at 879.
63. Corrigan, supra note 44, at 808. "[T]here is one overwhelming argument for the unitary
approach: it can actually be used to collect taxes." Cory, supra note 9, at 1138.
64. Cory, supra note 9, at 1138.
65. See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
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B. History of the Caifornia Unitary Tax Method
The earliest application of the unitary principle to apportionment
problems occurred in property tax cases involving railroad and tele-
graph companies operating in more than one state.66 Fairly simple ap-
portionment formulas, often involving only a single factor as the basis
for apportionment, were developed based on the ratio of in-state facili-
ties to total facilities maintained by that corporation.67 By the early
1920s, the United States Supreme Court had approved state use of an
apportionment method for income tax purposes if the method (1) was
not "inherently arbitrary" and did not "produce an unreasonable re-
sult"6 8 or (2) "reached, and was meant to reach, only profits earned
within the state."69 The simple, single factor apportionment formulas
that were tested in these early cases were viable for the relatively simple
business operations involved, that is, manufacturing or purchasing
products in one state and selling them in another.7" As the complexity
and size of multistate business entities increased, so did the complexity
of the apportionment methods7" and the taxpayers' challenges to those
methods. For example, California currently uses a method involving a
three factor formula based on gross sales, payroll, and property.72
In the 1942 landmark decision of Butler Brothers v. McColgan,73 the
United States Supreme Court approved the statutory74 apportionment
formula used in California.75 Earlier in the Butler case, the California
Supreme Court had stated:
[A]location of income, to the various states in which the business
is done, by means of a formula that gives weight to the various fac-
tors such as property, services of employees, and sales, which are re-
sponsible for the earning of income, appears entirely reasonable. 76
The California Supreme Court decision in Butler is also the source of
the frequently cited "three unities test" for determining the presence of
unity in an interstate business:
[The unitary nature of the appellant's business is definitely estab-
66. Corrigan, supra note 44, at 808. See generally State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575
(1975); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897).
67. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 475.
68. Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121.
69. Bass, Ratcliff& Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 281 (1924).
70. FRENTrz, supra note 2, at 475.
71. See Seago, supra note 1, at 104-08.
72. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101 (a); Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 8.
73. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), a'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
74. As originally codified, the allocation formula provided for allocation on the basis of sales,
purchases, expenses of manufacture, payroll, and value of situs of tangible property, but, soon
after this law was enacted, the taxing authorities began applying the three factor formula inprac-
lice. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 477.
75. Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 677, 111 P.2d at 341, 315 U.S. at 509.
76. Id
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lished by the presence of the following circumstances: (1) Unity of
ownership; (2) Unity of operation as evidenced by central purchas-
ing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3)
Unity of use in its centralized executive force and general system of
operation.
77
Thus, in Butler, the highest court of the state established an approach
to the determination of the presence of unity, an approach necessitated
by the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to explicitly de-
fine a unitary business.78
Five years after Butler, the California Supreme Court, in Edison Cal-
ifornia Stores, Inc. v. MeColgan ,7 reiterated the three unities test 0 and
then added another important and distinctive test of a unitary business
that has received wide usage by the courts: whether the business done
within California is "dependent upon or contributes to"8'the operation
of the business done outside the state.8 2 Most of the important cases in
this area," from the Edison case until present, have involved refine-
ments in the concept of what constitutes a unitary business.8 4 Both the
Butler three unities test and the Edison test are still used by the Califor-
nia courts and taxing authorities as the basic tests for unitariness in
California. 5 The courts frequently apply both tests in a single case.86
These tests, however, serve only as broad guidelines for developing the
factors of unity. The factors are used in assessing actual business oper-
ations to decide if the unity present is constitutionally sufficient to sup-
port income allocation for tax purposes. What will be considered
constitutionally sufficient is discussed in a later section of this
comment.8 7
If the three unities are present in a given factual situation, the unitary
nature of the business is definitely established 8 and the burden shifts to
the taxpayer to show that the apportionment method produces an arbi-
77. Id. at 678, 111 P.2d at 341.
78. Clariday, State Taxation by the Apportionment Method Under the Due Process and Com-
merce Clauses: Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes, 34 Sw. L.J. 1032, 1034, n.21
(1980). See generally, Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation oMultistate-Mul-
tinational Businesses, 10 URB. LAWv. 181 (1978) (discussing the various tests used by state courts).
79. 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
80. Id at 478, 183 P.2d at 20.
81. Id
82. Id at 480, 183 P.2d at 21.
83. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 472-85.
84. Id
85. Id The Edison test has also been incorporated into the California administrative regula-
tions describing the procedural rules for income allocation pursuant to Revenue and Taxation
Code section 25101. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
86. Container Corp., 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 993, 1000, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124, 129 (1981),
afld No. 81-523, slip op. (June 27, 1983); Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 130 Cal. App.
3d 15, 25, 28, 181 Cal. Rptr. 640, 646, 648 (1982).
87. See infra notes 173-245 and accompanying text.
88. Edison, 30 Cal. 2d at 480, 183 P.2d at 20.
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trary or unreasonable result.89 The rebuttable "presumption" created
by the presence of the three unities,90 and the "strong inference" of
unitariness created by the Edison test,91 are the end result of a case-by-
case analysis of the various factors into which these two tests can be
broken down.92 No "formula" or "magic combination" of these factors
of unity is used by the taxing authorities or the courts to determine
whether or not a unitary business is present.93The relative weight
placed upon the individual factors by the taxing authorities varies not
only with the type of business, but even with the passage of time.94 The
resultant shifts in emphasis upon certain factors often represent major
and permanent changes in the attitude of the California tax authorities.
When these authorities decide that the presence of a certain factor is
indicative of a unitary business, and the state courts agree when that
factor becomes an issue in a taxpayer challenge, the concurring court
decisions create important precedents in this area.
Two decisions in particular have had a significant impact on the cur-
rent California unitary method. First, a 1963 decision by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court based on a combination of Superior Oil Co. v.
Franchise Tax Board95 and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board,96 marked an important turning point in California unitary tax
decisions. Up until this time, a major "unity of operations" factor serv-
ing to establish the presence of a unitary business was whether or not
inventory flowed in or out of California in any appreciable amount. 97
The existence of a flow was almost prima facie evidence that a unitary
business existed.98 Court decisions in Superior Oil and Honolulu Oil
determined that a unitary business was present even though the taxpay-
ers in these cases had no significant intercompany flow of goods. 99 In
Superior Oil the court stated that "none of the three unities announced
[in Butler] as determinative necessarily requires the interstate move-
ment of products."'" The interrelationship between these tests for
unity and the factors derived for their implementation will be ex-
amined later in this comment. 01
89. Id
90. See id
91. See 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
92. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 479-85.
93. Id at 479.
94. Id
95. 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963).
96. 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963).
97. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 477.
98. Id
99. Id at 477-78.
100. Superior Oil, 60 Cal. 2d at 415, 386 P.2d at 550.
101. See infra notes 262-340 and accompanying text.
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The second decision having a significant impact on the California
unitary tax method was Chase Brass and Copper, Inc. v. Franchise Tax
Board,' decided in 1970. Prior to Chase Brass, the California tax
authorities had restricted the unitary business concept to affiliated cor-
porations "engaged in similar businesses."103 The Chase Brass decision
represented an expansion of the concept to include affiliated corpora-
tions engaged in widely divergent types of business if sufficient other
factors substantiated the finding." 4 Chase Brass is important because
vertically integrated'05 businesses, as well as horizontally integrated'06
businesses, now can be found to be unitary. The extension of the uni-
tary concept to include vertically integrated businesses has received
wide acceptance by both federal and state courts. 10 7 The administra-
tive regulations implementing the California Revenue and Taxation
Code now indicate that vertical integration is "strongly indicative" of a
unitary business.0 8
California statutory provisions governing the unitary tax method are
continuously evolving as legislative amendments and judicial construc-
tions of these provisions reflect the increasing complexity of multijuris-
dictional business forms'0 9 and attempts by the state to tax these
complex business operations within constitutional limits.'° The actual
computation of the California unitary tax, explained in the next section
of this comment, demonstrates the importance of the unitary business
concept in a due process analysis of the constitutionality of the appor-
tionment method.
102. 7 Cal. App. 3d 99, mod#Fed 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970).
103. The California administrative regulations interpreting the Revenue and Taxation Code
indicate that a strong inference of a unitary business exists when the taxpayer is engaged in the
same type of business out-of-state as that engaged in within California. This administrative con-
struction of the California tax laws is entitled to great weight, and the courts generally will not
depart from this construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Container Corp., 117
Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 129, affd No. 81-523, slip op. (June 27, 1983); 18 CAL.
ADMIN. CODE §25120(b). Upon review, the United States Supreme Court refused to find that the
state erred in endorsing this administrative presumption. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at
16.
104. Chase Brass, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 356. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at
478-79.
105. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25120(b).
For example, a taxpayer which explores for and mines copper ores; concentrates, smelts
and refines the copper ores; and fabricates the refined copper into consumer products is
engaged in a single trade or business, regardless of the fact that the various steps in the
process are operated substantially independently of each other with only general supervi-
sion from the taxpayer's executive offices.
Id.
106. "For example, a taxpayer which operates a chain of retail grocery stores will almost al-
ways be engaged in a single trade or business." Id
107. Anaconda, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 647; Container Corp., 117 Cal. App.
3d at 997, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 127, aff'd No. 81-523, slip op. (June 27, 1983).
108. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25120(b).
109. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 474-79.
110. Id
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C Computation of the Tax
The computation of the California unitary tax begins with a determi-
nation of the presence of a unitary business, i"' the only kind of busi-
ness to which this tax applies. The unitary income must then be
separated into business and nonbusiness components 1 2 and the Cali-
fornia taxable income computed. This computation may involve the
filing of a combined report." 3
L Determination of the Presence of a Unitary Business
The starting point in the computation of the California unitary tax is
section 25101 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code which de-
clares that if the income of the taxpayer is derived from, or attributable
to, sources both within and without the state, the tax must be measured
by the net income derived from, or attributable to, sources within the
state. 14 Thus, upon a finding that the taxpayer's business activity
outside of California is separate and distinct from any California busi-
ness activity, the taxpayer can comply with this provision by reporting
California-source income as determined by traditional separate ac-
counting methods.' '1 Income from any out-of-state business activity
that is thus determined not to be unitary simply is not taxable in Cali-
fornia. 16 Therefore, the only out-of-state income involved in the re-
mainder of the computation is income found to be from a unitary
business.
California Administrative Code section 25101(a)' 17 describes the
procedure to be followed when the taxpayer's activities clearly are not
divisible along state lines:
Where the California activities are a part of a unitary business car-
ried on within and without the State, the portion of the unitary in-
come subject to tax in California is generally determined by a three-
factor formula of tangible property, payroll and sales.18
Section 25101(a) also includes the codification of the Edison test de-
scribed in a previous section of this comment:"I9 if the in-state business
operation "is dependent on or contributes to" out-of-state business op-
111. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 129-64 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
114. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25101.
115. Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 667-68, 111 P.2d at 336; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
116. See 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a). "[W]hat appellant must show, in order to establish
that its... income is not subject to an apportioned tax in Vermont, is that the income was earned
in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of. . .products in that State." Mobil Oil, 445 U.S.
at 439 (emphasis added).
117. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
118. Id
119. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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erations, the entire operation is unitary. 20 Inpractice the question of
whether the taxpayer's business activity outside of California is unitary
with, or truly separate from, the in-state activity, usually arises as fol-
lows: (1) a return is filed on the basis that the taxpayer's interstate busi-
ness activity is not unitary; (2) a contrary finding is made by the
Franchise Tax Board [hereinafter referred to as the FTB]; (3) the FTB
field auditors present a list of questions to the officials of the corporate
taxpayer under examination;' 2 ' and (4) the answers are used by the
FTB in determining the extent to which various "factors" of unitariness
are present between the in-state and out-of-state segments of the busi-
ness.' 22 These factors of unitariness are those that are believed to be
significant by the staff and field auditors of the FTB in deciding
whether a unitary business is present. 23
Although a general list of the factors that will be considered by the
FTB can be distilled from the case law in this area, the FTB claims not
to use any "formula" in determining whether or not the factors present
add up to a finding of unity.' 24 The reason that a formula cannot be
devised is that one or two factors may be of such importance in a par-
ticular business that the business would be treated as unitary even
though all of the other factors are either absent or insignificant.125 In a
later section of this comment, 26 the factors currently applied by the
FTB will be discussed and compared with the factors that the United
States Supreme Court found satisfactorily indicative of a unitary busi-
ness in the ASA.RCO and Woolworth decisions.'2 7 After the factors of
unitariness have been considered, and the FTB determines a unitary
business is present, the next step in computing the unitary tax is the
separation of business and nonbusiness income. This is a very impor-
tant step because the only income apportionable under the California
unitary tax method is business income.' 28
2. Separation of Business and Nonbusiness Income
If an interstate business is found to be unitary, the total gross income
from the unitary portion of that business should be determined, and
then the nonbusiness, and thus nonapportionable, income is separated
120. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
121. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 477.
122. Id;see, e.g., Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 11-13.
123. Id at 479.
124. Id at 477.
125. Id at 479.
126. See infra notes 262-321 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 262-340 and accompanying text.
128. 18 CAL. ADMIN CODE §25101(f); see Keesling & Warren, Uniform Division of Income/or
Tax PurposesAct, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 156, 167 (1967); Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 5.
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from the business income." 9 Instead of being apportioned 30 on a for-
mulary basis like the taxpayer's business income, the nonbusiness in-
come is allocated'3 1 according to situs.132 The statutes, and the related
administrative regulations, 33 describe the basis for allocation of the
various types of nonbusiness income.' 34
Nonbusiness income 35 is defined in Section 25120 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code as "all income other than business income."'' 36
Thus, it is necessary to use the definition for business income 37 to de-
termine what constitutes nonbusiness income. The statute defines busi-
ness income as "income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business."' 138 Business income
includes income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisi-
tion, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral
parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations. 39 The
usual classification of income by "labels," for example, manufacturing
income, sales income, interest, dividends, or rents, is of no aid in deter-
mining whether income is business or nonbusiness. 40 Income of any
type, and from any source, that arises from transactions and activities
occurring in the regular course of a taxpayer's trade or business may be
business income.' 4  The principal types of nonbusiness income, how-
ever, are dividends, interest, rents, capital gains, royalties, and partner-
ship income. 4 2
Upon completion of the allocation process, 4 3 the total nonbusiness
income allocable to the taxpayer's activity in California will have been
determined.'" After offset of the allowable deductions attributable to
129. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(d).
130. "Apportionment" generally refers to the division of business income between states by
the use of a formula containing apportionment factors. Id. §25101(f).
131. "Allocation" generally refers to the assignment of nonbusiness income to aparticular
state. Id
132. Id §25101(d).
133. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§25124-25127; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§25124-25127.
134. In general, income from tangible nonbusiness assets and any gain or loss on the disposi-
tion of these assets are allocated to the physical situs of the property. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 495.
The income from intangible property and any gain or loss on disposition of this type of asset are
allocated to the physical situs of the property only if the property has acquired a "business situs"
there, usually resulting in the income being allocated to the taxpayer's commercial domicile. Id
135. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(d).




140. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25120(a).
141. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 494.
142. Id
143. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text; see generally CAL. REV. & TAX CODE
§§25124-25127 (these sections describe the allocation process).
144. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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this share of nonbusiness income, 145 the result is that taxpayer's net
California nonbusiness income. This amount is then combined with
that portion of the taxpayer's business income that is apportionable to
California, as determined in the remainder of this section, 46 and the
result will be the taxpayer's total taxable income in California. 147
Once nonbusiness income has been separated from the total income
of the multijurisdictional corporate taxpayer's entire unitary business,
offset by allowable deductions attributable thereto, 14  the applicable
California statute requires that all remaining business income be ap-
portioned among the states involved.14 9 Apportionment is required to
be made by multiplying the income by a fraction. 5 ° The numerator of
this fraction is the property factor'"' plus the payroll factor'52 plus the
sales factor, " and the denominator is simply the number three. 154 This
is the three factor formula used by the California tax authorities and
approved by the United States Supreme Court in the Butler
case. 55Basically the formula involves five steps:
(I) Divide California property by total unitary property. 15 6
(2) Divide California payroll by total unitary payroll.' 57
(3) Divide California sales by total unitary sales.' 58
(4) Divide the total of (1), (2), and (3) by the number 3 and this will
be the percentage of unitary income that is apportionable to
California.
(5) Multiply the total net unitary business income of the multijuris-
dictional corporation by the percentage arrived at in step (4) to
145. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25120(d).
146. See infra notes 147-61.
147. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 494.
148. Any allowable deductions that are applicable to both business and nonbusiness income of
the taxpayer must be prorated on a consistent basis to those classes of income in determining
income subject to tax. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25232(d).
149. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25128.
150. Id
151. Id §25129; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a). "The property. . . is valued at its original
cost without any deduction for depreciation, depletion, etc." FRENTz, supra note 2, at 500.
152. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25134; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a).
153. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25134; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a) (this factor is com-
puted on gross sales or receipts, less returns and allowances).
154. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §25128.
155. Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 677, 111 P.2d at 341, 315 U.S. at 509.
156. The property factor normally includes the average value of all real and tangible personal
property owned by the taxpayer and used in the unitary business. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§25129; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a); FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 499.
157. The payroll factor includes all compensation paid to offcers and employees, thus necessi-
tating that any amount paid to agents, brokers, or independent contractors be distinguished. CAL.
REV. & TAX CODE §25132; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(a); FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 501.
158. The sales factor is generally apportioned in accordance with the employee sales activity
of the taxpayer within and without the state. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25134; 18 CAL. ADMIN.
CODE §25101(a). This factor could be argued to be a duplication of the property and payroll
factors, and this has often been the contention of taxpayers challenging an apportionment.
FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 499.
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yield apportioned Calfornia income from the unitary business.'5 9
California Administrative Code sections 25101 and 25129 through
25136, inclusive, contain extensive provisions describing the process of
ascertaining the three factors in the formula. 160
In addition, California Revenue and Taxation Code section 25137
provides that a taxpayer may petition for, or the FTB may require, a
deviation from the ordinary three factor formula in any case in which
application of this formula does not produce results that are fairly rep-
resentative of the extent of the taxpayer's business in California. 16'
The "alternatives" offered include: (a) separate accounting; (b) exclu-
sion of one or more additional factors of the formula that will fairly
represent the taxpayer's business activity in the state; (c) inclusion of
one or more additional factors of the formula that will fairly represent
the taxpayer's business activity in the state; or (d) any other method
necessary to effectuate an equitable apportionment of the taxpayer's
income. 6 ' Section 25137 thus gives rise to the "special" formulas that
have been developed for a limited number of industries including
financial corporations, construction contractors, airlines, and motion
pictures. 63 Regardless of the method used, the share of the unitary
business income apportioned to California next must be combined with
taxpayer's other in-state income to determine the California taxable in-
come of the corporation. 1'1
3. Caiffornia Taxable Income and the Combined Report
The final step in the unitary tax computation is to combine the non-
business income allocated to California with the unitary business in-
come apportioned to California to produce California income subject to
tax. 165 The tax liability on this income then is computed in the same
manner as for corporations doing business only within the state. 66
When a multijurisdictional taxpayer is doing business as a group of
affiliated corporations, as opposed to operating a single corporation
with multiple divisions, the computation of the unitary tax is more
complicated. 67 If a multijurisdictional corporation is operating in a
multicorporate form and any two or more of the corporations are
159. Frentz, supra note 2, at 498.
160. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§25101, 25129-36.
161. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §25137.
162. Id
163. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 506-11.
164. Id at 494.
165. 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §25101(0.
166. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 488-89.
167. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
1983 / Unitary Tax
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same interest,'68 the
FTB may permit or require the filing of a combined report to determine
apportionable unitary income.169 California law, however, requires
that every corporation file a separate return even though that corpora-
tion is part of a group that is permitted or required to file a combined
report. 7 ' The California portion of the unitary income for the com-
bined group is first determined by the apportionment formula and then
each of the separate corporations is apportioned its individual share.'7
The individual corporation then combines this "share" of apportioned
income with other corporate income taxable in California and reports
the total amount on its own franchise tax return.1
7 2
Whether or not a combined report is fied, the unitary tax method is
not only conceptually complex, but also complex when applied. When
a state attempts to tax a multijurisdictional corporation, and traditional
separate accounting is found to be inadequate for this purpose because
the interstate business activity of the taxpayer is unitary, constitutional
issues may arise. The next section of this comment will discuss these
constitutional issues with a focus on challenges to the unitary tax based
on the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UNITARY TAX METHOD--A DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
Four major recent United States Supreme Court decisions, Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Vermont Commissioner of Taxes' 73 and Exxon Corp. v. Wiscon-
sin Department of Revenue 174 in 1980 vindicating the right of the states
to tax foreign source' 75 income of multijurisdictional corporations,' 76
and4S4RCO and Woolworth in 1982 limiting that same right,' 77 were
all decided on the basis of a due process analysis and the unitary busi-
ness principle. The following section will begin with an exploration of
the due process limitations on state taxation of multijurisdictional busi-
nesses. The section will start with the basic constitutional premise that
168. Direct or indirect ownership or control of more than 50 percent of the voting stock of the
taxpayer will constitute control for this purpose. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25105.
169. Id §25102. The combined report should be distinguished from a consolidated tax return.
FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 487.
170. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 487.
171. Id
172. Id If a combined report is used in determining the unitary tax, intercompany dividends
paid within the combined group are eliminated from the income of the recipient if the dividend
was paid out of income already included in the combined report. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§25106.
173. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
174. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
175. See supra note 25.
176. See Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 442; Exxon, 447 U.S. at 225.
177. See4SA4RCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3112; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3129.
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a "taking" of property without due process is prohibited and conclude
with the presentation of the two part test that has evolved to meet due
process requirements. 178 In light of the current emphasis on the role of
the unitary business principle in the due process limitations, the re-
mainder of the section will focus on the relationship of that concept to
the constitutionality of the California unitary tax.
A. The Role of the Unitary Business Concept in a Due Process
Anasis of State Taxation
The United States Constitution expressly prohibits a state from tak-
ing property without due process of law. t 79 Thus, the initial due pro-
cess limitation on the taxing scheme of a state is that the state "must
have given something for which it can ask a return."' 0 The earliest
challenge to a state employing the apportionment method of income
taxation was based on the contention that this method violated the due
process rights of the taxpayer on grounds that the result was to tax,
directly or indirectly, income arising from business conducted beyond
the borders of the taxing state.' The United States Supreme Court
upheld the tax and based on the unitary business concept, 8 2 held that
the formula employed was presumptively valid. 83
Similarly, in Butler the United States Supreme Court approved the
propriety of applying the unitary concept in taxing interstate busi-
nesses, 184 refining and clarifying the concept by establishing the "three
unities" test 8 ' for unitariness previously described.8 6 In addition, the
Supreme Court approved the apportionment formula used by Califor-
nia as "fairly calculated" to "reasonably attribute" income to the busi-
ness conducted in the state. 87 Finally, Butler is the source of the often-
cited proposition that a particular accounting system, although a useful
business tool, may not accurately reflect the amount of income earned
178. See infra notes 173-252 and accompanying text.
179. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, §1; Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
180. J C Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444; Seago, supra note 1, at 102, In the words of the Penney
Court:
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by
practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities
which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred
by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
181. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920).
182. Id
183. Id at 121.
184. See Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 677, 111 P.2d 341, 315 U.S. at 509.
185. Id at 506.
186. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
187. Butler, 315 U.S. at 506.
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within the taxing state.188
Reliance upon the inadequacies of the separate accounting
method 8 9 to support the presumptive validity of a state apportionment
method of taxation, 190 however, was far from innovative by the time of
the Butler decision.' 9 ' In fact, this "theory" continues to be a recurrent
theme in the litigation regarding state taxation of interstate business. 92
Thus, the statement is often made that separate accounting will not
yield the "true" income that a multijurisdictional corporation has
earned within any one state of operation if that taxpayer is engaged in
a unitary business.193 Furthermore, the litigation format of the appor-
tionment cases 194 often begins with a finding that the multijurisdic-
tional corporation is engaged in a unitary business so that a
presumption of validity attaches to the state apportionment formula.
Any attempt by the taxpayer to rebut that presumption by using tradi-
tional separate accounting then is found to be inadequate. 191 If the liti-
gation format sounds circular, that is because it is circular. The
impossibility of identifying the specific "source" of income earned from
a series of transactions is the definition of unitariness.196 This is a good
example of the reason why the earlier decisions involving state taxation
of interstate business were circumspect in their use of descriptive "tags"
of this nature. In Wisconsin v. J C. Penney Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court cautioned:
We cannot. . .be too often reminded that the limits on the otherwise
autonomous powers of the states are those in the Constitution and
not verbal weapons imported into it... [t]hese tags are not instru-
ments of adjudication but statements of result in applying the consti-
tutional test. 197
Apparent from the case law is the fact that by the end of the 1960's the
constitutional test under the due process clause applicable to the power
of a state to tax interstate business had become firmly set. 198 The next
188. Id
189. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
190. Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121.
191. Butler, 315 U.S. at 506; Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121 ("faced with the impossibility of
allocating specifically the profits earned. . .within its borders); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 281 (1924).
192. Edison, 30 Cal. 2d at 482, 183 P.2d at 22 (plaintiff's evidence of its separate accounting,
and the accuracy and reasonableness thereof, did not overcome the correctness of the formula);
Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438 (although separate geographical accounting may be useful for internal
auditing, for purposes of state taxation it is not constitutionally required).
193. See Seago, supra note 1, at 103-04.
194. Id; Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscriotion
of the Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487, 493 (1968).
195. Seago, supra note 1, at 104.
196. See id. at 103.
197. J.C Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
198. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978).
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section of this comment will examine the due process requirements for
constitutionality of a state apportionment method of taxation and the
difficulties the courts have encountered in applying this test.
B. State Apportionment Methods of Taxation. The Test for
Constitutionality Under the Due Process Clause
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment places two re-
strictions on state power to tax income generated by the activities of an
interstate business.' 99 First, no tax may be imposed unless a nexus,
some minimal connection, can be found between those interstate activi-
ties and the taxing state.2" Second, the income attributed to the state
for tax purposes by the apportionment method must bear a rational
relationship to the intrastate value of the enterprise. 20 1 The United
States Supreme Court in the Container Corp. decision added that these
principles require that the out-of-state activities of the purported uni-
tary business be related in some concrete way to the in-state activities.20 2
The statement of this test for constitutionality under the due process
clause appears deceptively simple. The two restrictions stem from the
even simpler, but controlling question of whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask a return.2 3 The basis for the two part test
must be remembered when sorting out the complicating elements en-
countered in the application of the restrictions. For example, applica-
tion of the test may be more difficult depending on whether the
taxpayer is (1) operating as a multistate or as a multinational business,
(2) operating in a multidivisional or a multicorporate form, or (3) being
subjected to a single factor or a multiple factor formulary apportion-
ment method. The two parts of the due process test will be examined
separately in the following sections.
L The Nexus Test
The purpose served by each of the two parts of the due process
test,2°4 and the role played therein by the unitary business concept,20
5
are most clearly discernible when the due process test is applied to a
199. Id at 272-73.
200. Id at 273; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967):
Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954) ("some minimum connection between a state
and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax"); Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 4.
201. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 273; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri St. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,
325 (1968); Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (193 1)(the tax
cannot be "out of all appropriate proportion" to the business transacted in that state); Container
Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 4.
202. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 4.
203. JC Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
204. See infra notes 173-252 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 179-98 and accompanying text.
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single corporation operating in interstate commerce through various
branches. For example, if a corporation consists of only two operating
divisions, one refining oil in California (Division A), and the other sell-
ing that refined oil in Nevada (Division B), the total corporate income
($100,000) would be received in the state of Nevada as revenue from
sales. California, however, would have the requisite nexus with the cor-
poration, not just with Division A, because the corporation has availed
itself of the "substantial privilege"20 6 of carrying on business within the
state.207
The entire basis for this conclusion, that the California nexus is with
the interstate activity as a whole, rests upon the unitary business princi-
ple. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he linchpin
of apportionability is the unitary-business principle." 208 In the previ-
ous example, only Division A is truly "availing itself of the privilege of
doing business" in California. Therefore, if the income earned as a re-
sult of the refining process could be separately determined, the income
of that division is all that California could constitutionally tax.2 9 The
Division A income cannot be specifically determined, however, because
the total income of $100,000 was earned in a series of transactions that
are inseparable in a traditional accounting sense. The two divisions are
engaged in a unitary business because the total income is inseparable.
The total income is inseparable because the divisions are unitary.
Therefore, what appears to be circular reasoning is actually a conceptu-
alization of a factual state of business activity integrated to such a de-
gree that the required nexus is established, not between the state and
the intrastate activity (Division A), but between the state and the in-
terstate activity, the entire corporation. The state taxing authorities
have thus developed "factors of unity" 210 as guidelines against which to
measure the individual facts of each case for the purpose of detecting
the presence of a unitary business.
21l
Examination of this portion of the constitutional test, the nexus test,
in a situation as simple as that portrayed in the example, clearly reveals
that the inseparability of the California and Nevada business activity is
what necessitates a finding that the interstate business of the corpora-
tion is unitary. When any portion of the corporate business, regardless
of whether conducted in or out of California, is distinct enough that
206. J.C Penney, 311 U.S. at 444-45.
207. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 437.
208. Id at 439.
209. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80, 81 (1938) (a state may not
tax value earned outside its borders).
210. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 479-85.
211. Id; see infra notes 262-340 and accompanying text.
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separate accountability for the earnings generated is possible, that por-
tion is by definition, no longer a part of the unitary enterprise.
In applying the due process nexus test, however, the multicorporate
form of operation can cloud the issue substantially. In the earlier ex-
ample, income received by either division would be reflected in the sep-
arate accounting records simply as $100,000 of income earned by the
corporation, without distinction as to which division originally received
that income. If the example is changed so that the California refining
operations are organized as the parent corporation (Corporation A)
and the selling operations in Nevada are organized as a subsidiary cor-
poration (Corporation B), the results are considerably different. The
income of Corporation B, as determined by the separate accounting
method, could be reported as anything from zero to $100,000. The
same is true for the separate accounting income reported for Corpora-
tion A because the business enterprise determines the transfer pricing
policy that company will use.21 2
Nevertheless, if the interstate business in the example is determined
to be unitary, the entire $100,000 would be subjected to apportionment.
The confusion in applying the nexus test arises in the actual computa-
tion of the unitary tax. Assuming that the separate accounting records
reflected the entire income in Corporation B, the Nevada subsidiary,
the required combined report 13 would reflect $100,000 of unitary in-
come from B, plus zero income from Corporation A, for a total com-
bined unitary income of $100,000. This total combined unitary income
is the base that will be apportioned according to the apportionment
formula employed by the taxing state. In this example, the computa-
tion resulted in the true unitary income of $100,000, but the result
would not have been correct if any dividends had been paid between
the two corporations. Thus, if subsidiary Corporation B had paid divi-
dends of $50,000 to parent Corporation A during the year, the resulting
combined report would be distorted. Separate accounting records
would show an income of $50,000 for Corporation A, representing the
dividends received, and the original income of $100,000 for Corpora-
tion B. The required combined report would thus result in an incorrect
total unitary income of $150,000. California has eliminated this "com-
putational error" by enacting California Revenue and Taxation Code
section 25106, declaring that dividends received from another corpora-
tion that is a member of the unitary group need not be included in the
212. But cf. Taggert, supra note 57, at 177 ("complaints against the arm's length method...
fail to take account of a number of pressures. . . which operate to insure that the prices charged
in intercorporate transactions are arm's length").
213. CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE §25102.
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combined report if the dividends were paid out of unitary income.2 14
Both ASARCO and Woolworth provide additional insight into a thor-
ough understanding of the due process nexus test.
a. ASARCO
ASARCO, and the Woolworth decision discussed in the next section,
are landmark decisions because they represent the first time that the
United States Supreme Court has employed the due process nexus test
to deny a state the right to apportion income.215 Both of these cases
primarily concerned dividends received by a nondomiciliary 2 6 parent
corporation from subsidiary corporations.21 '7 The special issues inher-
ent in this type of income, dividend income, were never reached in
ASARCO and Woolworth because the nexus requirement was not
met.218
In ASARCO the main issue was whether dividends from five other
ASARCO subsidiaries, received by the nondomiciliary parent, were
subject to apportionment by Idaho.219 ASARCO, Inc. is commercially
domiciled in New York but subsidiaries of the corporation mine, smelt,
and refine various metals in other states, including Idaho.22 The com-
pany has various investment interests in other corporations, most in-
volving mining operations, and some located outside of the United
States.2 2' The United States Supreme Court held in theASARCO case
that the Idaho business activity did not have the requisite nexus to the
business activities of the five foreign subsidiaries to be classified as a
unitary business222 and therefore, the attempt by Idaho to tax that in-
come violated the due process clause.223
InASARCO the taxpayer's trade or business2 24 was silver mining.225
In theory, the determination of whether or not the Idaho subsidiary
and the New York parent are a unitary business enterprise is made by
214. Id §25106.
215. Seago,supra note I, at 102.
216. Nondomiciliary here means commercially domiciled in a state other than that of the
taxpayer. See generalyAS4RCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3111-13 (taxpayer was an Idaho corporation and
the subsidiary in question was domiciled in Peru, the parent corporation in New York).
217. Id.
218. Seago, supra note 1, at 102 (although dividends raised a host of problems specifically
related to that form of income, these issues were moot in these cases because the nexus test was not
satisfied).
219. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3105.
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id at 3112.
223. Id at 3116.
224. Only income arising from the taxpayer's trade or business is included in business in-
come. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25120(a).
225. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3105.
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examining the relationship between the silver mining and the business
activity of the parent in New York.226 This examination is not made in
some abstract sense between two entities, but between the Idaho activ-
ity, silver mining, and each of the various activities carried on by
ASARCO, Inc. in New York. Accordingly, upon the finding of the
Court inASARCO that the parent corporation and the Idaho taxpayer
were operating as a unitary business, 227 the Court still had to determine
theportion of the activity of the New York parent company that should
be unitized on the basis of this determination. "One must look princi-
pally at the underlying activity, not at the form of investment, to deter-
mine the propriety of apportionability." 228 For example, one segment
of ASARCO, Inc.'s business was engaged in by the parent corporation
in the form of a Peruvian subsidiary that had paid dividends to the
parent during the tax year.229 The ASARCO Court held that this par-
ticular activity was not sufficiently connected with the Idaho silver min-
ing to be classified as part of the unitary group.230 The basis for this
holding of the Court focused on the functional and managerial rela-
tionships between the Peruvian subsidiary and the parent corporation,
the dividend payee.23'
One of the main causes for the current controversy between taxpay-
ing corporations and the taxing states is exemplified by the major con-
tention of the dissenting opinion 232 in ASARCO that the majority
approach erred by even examining the source of the dividends. This
goes to the heart of the nexus test issue because to meet the test, a state
apportionment method must reach only income from activity with
which the taxing state has some minimal connection.233 The unitary
226. Id at 3115. The Court quotes Mobil Oil:
We cannot accept, consistently with recognized due process standards, a definition of
'unitary business' that would permit nondomiciliary States to apportion and tax divi-
dends [w]here the business activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with the
activities of the recipient in the taxing State. (emphasis added)
Id.
227. This determination was made at a lower level before reaching the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 3107.
228. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 440 (as quoted in .4SARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3116).
229. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3111-12.
230. Id at 3112.
231. Id at 3111-12
Although Southern Peru sold ASARCO 35 percent of its output and was potentially
subject to its control, the Court, after examining the details of management contracts,
cited trial court findings and evidence to the effect that ASARCO did not 'control South-
ern Peru in any sense of that term.' It therefore concluded that 'ASARCO's Idaho silver
mining and Southern Peru's autonomous business are insufficiently connected to permit
the two companies to be classified as a unitary business.'
Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Mult{/urisdictional Corporations, Part II." Reflections on
ASARCO and Woolworth, 81 MICH. L. REV. 157, 171 (1982).
232. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, with Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist joining in the dissent. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3117.
233. See supra notes 204-14 and accompanying text..
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business principle embodies this limitation. The way unity is deter-
mined thus becomes the essence of the nexus test. The conclusion of
the dissent was based on the premise that once the taxpayer and the
parent corporation were found to be a unitary enterprise, all income
from their respective activities must be included in the unitary base
subject to apportionment. 234 The weakness in this reasoning 235 is re-
vealed by noting the result that would be reached if the facts in
ASARCO are changed only slightly. Assume that instead of carrying
on the Peruvian operations in the corporate form, the parent had sim-
ply engaged in that particular activity through the use of a Peruvian
Division of the New York corporation. This change would not alter
the finding of the Court that under the majority approach inASARCO,
the activity in Peru still would not be part of the unitary operations
engaged in by the New York parent and the Idaho taxpayer since the
activity in Peru did not change.236 Thus, just a technical change in the
form of the business clearly shows that the portion of the parent's in-
come arising from the Peruvian operations simply did not arise from
the same trade or business as the portion of the parent's income unit-
ized with the Idaho silver mines. Futhermore, as discussed earlier in
this comment,2 3 7 whether the parent received the income from the Pe-
ruvian operation directly, or in the form of dividends from an affiliated
corporation is irrelevant.238 This would merely be a triumph of form
over substance and would frustrate the purpose of the due process
nexus test.239 Thus, if the California apportionment method is to meet
the nexus test, the income from out-of-state activities that is to be unit-
ized and taxed by California must be identified by factors that focus on
the inseparability of the underlying economic activity. The Supreme
Court in Woolworth further clarified the teaching of the ASARCO de-
cision regarding the unitary business principle and the due process
nexus test.
b. Woolworth
Similar to the attempt made by Idaho in the ASARCO case, the
Woolworth case involved an attempt by New Mexico to tax an appor-
tioned share of the dividends received by the New York parent corpo-
234. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3118.
235. See id. at 3116, n.24. The dissent purports to rely upon Mobil and Exxon and yet its
basic arguments, in practical effect, would seriously undermine their force as precedents. Id
236. See id at 3112.
237. See supra notes 179-98 and accompanying text.
238. SeeASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3112.
239. Id "[Tihe unitary business apportionment concept is based on an economic approach
that ought not be avoided by the technical niceties of legal distinctions between controlled subsidi-
aries and divisions or branches."
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ration from foreign subsidiaries of the parent.24 The United States
Supreme Court again held that the state could not include these divi-
dends in apportionable income because of a failure to meet the nexus
test, or in the words of the Court: "We conclude that this tax does not
bear the necessary relationship to opportunities, benefits, or protection
conferred or afforded by the taxing state."'241 F.W. Woolworth, Co., a
parent corporation commercially domiciled in New York, operates a
chain of retail stores located in several states, including New Mexico
where the taxpayer in this case was operating.242 In addition, Wool-
worth owns four foreign subsidiaries in Germany, Canada, Mexico,
and England.243
The issues regarding the nexus test in ASARCO and Woolworth ba-
sically were the same, but an important difference existed in the two
cases arising from their organizational form. ASARCO, Inc. is organ-
ized on a vertically integrated basis, whereas F.W. Woolworth, Co. is a
horizontally integrated multijurisdictional corporation. This difference
has a bearing on the nexus test because of the difference upon the uni-
tary business principle. Instead of finding a unitary business present
because of an inseparable series of income producing transactions, the
detection of unitariness in a horizontally integrated business becomes a
question of whether contributions to income by the subsidiaries re-
sulted from functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale, or from activities that are separate and discrete. 2"
Thus, the difference between the ASARCO and Woolworth cases, verti-
cal versus horizontal integration, is reflected in the issue of whether
interstate activity is part of a unitary business.245 This issue requires a
finding of unity that, in turn, involves the application of "factors of
unitariness." The second half of the due process test for constitutional-
ity, the rational relationship test, was not reached in Woolworth or
ASARCO for reasons discussed in the following section of this com-
ment. While the nexus test examines constitutional limitations upon
the income a state may include in the apportionable base, the rational
relationship test relates to the apportionmentprocess itself.
2. A Rational Relationsho
The second restriction on the power of a state to tax income gener-
ated by interstate business activities is often called the "rational rela-
240. Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3132.
241. Id at 3139.
242. Seago, supra note 1, at 114.
243. Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3131.
244. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 438.
245. See Seago, supra note I at 114-18.
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tionship test." Basically, this part of the due process test questions
whether the state apportionment formula is doing the job it was devel-
oped to do. This is satisfied if "the method of relating the income to
the jurisdiction is 'fairly calculated' to reasonably attribute the income
to the business conducted in the state."246 In the Butler decision, the
United States Supreme Court approved the Calfornia method of ap-
portionment and specifically approved the three factor formula cur-
rently used by the state.2 47  The development of the rational
relationship portion of the due process test in the case law reveals an
early and unwavering predisposition of the United States Supreme
Court to presumptively support state formulas.2 4 8
If, however, the state method is inherently arbitrary, or the state
formula as applied to a particular taxpayer produces an unreasonable
result, the apportionment method would be unconstitutional under the
due process clause.249 The decisions in this area have been invariable,
however, in holding that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show
that the result of the apportionment method was unfair or arbitrary. 5 0
With respect to the burden of proof, the rational relationship test and
the nexus test are the same:
To exclude income from apportionment, the taxpayer must show by
clear and cogent evidence that the income is earned from a separate
and distinct business operating outside the taxing state, and not from
a unitary business that conducts some activities within that state.2 5'
Although formula issues were raised in ASARCO and Woolworth,
these issues were not reached because the nexus test was not
satisfied.252
3. The Due Process Constitutionality of the Calfornia Unitary Tax
Method" Proposed Statutory Amendments
This comment has thus far discussed the development of the due
process test for constitutionality as applied to the California formulary
apportionment method of taxing multijurisdictional corporations. 3 A
careful examination of the current application of California Revenue
and Taxation Code section 25101 has shown a problem may arise be-
cause not all income that the state might attempt to reach for appor-
246. Id at 103, Butler, 315 U.S. at 506.
247. See generally Butler, 315 U.S. 501.
248. Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121; Bass, 266 U.S. at 283.
249. Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121; Bass, 266 U.S. at 283.
250. Underwood, 254 U.S. at 121; Bass, 266 U.S. at 283; see also Hans Rees' Sons, 283 U.S.
123, 135 (1931).
251. Clariday, supra note 78, at 1036. See Butler, 315 U.S. at 507; Moorman, 437 U.S. at 274.
252. Seago, supra note 1, at 103.
253. See supra notes 173-253 and accompanying text.
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tionment would be considered constitutionally apportionable by the
United States Supreme Court.254 One possible resolution to this prob-
lem would be to amend section 25101 and administrative regulations
implementing that section, to clarify exactly what income cannot be
constitutionally reached in light of the United States Supreme Court
decisions in ASARCO and Woolworth.
In these two cases the Supreme Court has left no doubt that income
arising from out-of-state business activity cannot be apportioned by a
state for tax purposes if the activity in question is discrete from the
activity in the taxing state.255 ASARCO and Woolworth thus expressly
focused the question of constitutionality on the issue of unity. Califor-
nia Revenue and Taxation Code section 25101 should be amended to
insure that the FTB and the California courts will interpret that section
to preclude the inclusion of income from any out-of-state business
whose activities are unrelated to the taxpayer's activities in Caifor-
nia. 256 The United States Supreme Court in the Container Corp. case
made note of this weakness in the California statute by stating that:
Although the statute does not explicitly require that income from dis-
tinct business enterprises be apportioned separately, this requirement
antedated adoption of the Uniform Act [from which the relevant pro-
visions of the statute are derived], and has not been abandoned.257
Amending section 25101 to state expressly that the form of the out-
of-state income will not be determinative could prevent the errors in
application exemplified by the apportionment process used by Idaho
and New Mexico in ASARCO and Woolworth. If section 25101
stresses the concept of substance over form, the law will guide those
interpreting the section in the right direction and prevent them from
going off on the incorrect tangent of examining the relationship be-
tween the out-of-state activity in question and the activity of a non-
domiciliary258 affiliate. 5 9 In addition to amending section 25101 and
the pertinent California administrative regulations, the current factors
of unity used in this state must be updated to reflect views of the United
States Supreme Court as expressed in ASARCO and Woolworth.26°
As previously discussed,26' the initial step in computing the unitary
tax is to determine the presence of a unitary business. This determina-
tion is based upon those factors of unity that "signal" the presence of
254. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 215-45 and accompanying text.
256. Id
257. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 5.
258. See supra note 216.
259. See supra notes 204-45 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 262-340 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
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unity to taxing authorities. A heavy emphasis is placed upon the uni-
tary business concept by the United States Supreme Court inASARCO
and Woolworth as the basis for constitutional apportionment. This em-
phasis necessitates a careful examination of the unitary operation. The
following section will discuss the importance of the unitary business
concept. In addition, the section will examine the factors of unitariness
found appropriate inASARCO and Woolworth and compare those fac-
tors with the factors currently used by the California taxing authorities.
THE UNITARY BUSINESS CONCEPT AND THE FACTORS
OF UNITARINESS
The United States Supreme Court has made the unitary business
concept an extremely important concept to understand. The Court re-
peatedly has stated that in theory, the concept of unity is the central
and cohesive element of the apportionability issue.262 First, in Mobil
and Exxon, the Supreme Court suggested that a due process limitation
would prevent a state from apportioning the income of a multijurisdic-
tional corporation arising from interstate business activites if that tax-
payer sustained the burden of proving the corporate activity outside of
the taxing state was unrelated to the in-state business of the taxpayer.263
Later, inASARCO and Woolworth, the Court determined that the tax-
payers had met this burden of showing the income at issue was earned
from discrete out-of-state activities. The income thus could not be
reached by the taxing states.264
Undoubtedly, ASARCO and Woolworth have been encouraging to
multistate and multinational corporations in the ongoing controversy
between multijurisdictional businesses and taxing authorities of the
various states. The current nationwide increase in challenges to the
apportionment method is indicative of this fact.265 The United States
Supreme Court in the recent Container Corp. decision, however, has
clarified the reasoning supporting the rejection of state attempts to unit-
ize the multijurisdictional taxpayers in ASARCO and Woolworth.266
The Court in ASARCO concluded that factual findings by the state
262. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 439; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
473-74, nn. 25, 26 (1978).
263. Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 442; Exxon, 447 U.S. at 223.
264. ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3112; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3139.
265. Hellerstein, surpa note 231 at 157.
The... Court['s]...latest attempts to delineate the constitutional restraints on the
states' power to tax a multijurisdictional corporation's income has refined in important
respects the permissive approach reflected in Mobil and Exxon. More significantly, the
Court's opinions in ASARCO and Woolworth bespeak a more active role for the Court
than it has previously played in scrutinizing state division-of-income methods.
Id 266. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 15, n. 15.
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court did not support a unitary business finding because the partial
subsidiaries were "not realistically subject to even minimal control" by
ASARCO and thus were "passive investments in the most basic sense
of the term." '267 The decision by the Supreme Court in Woolworth rep-
resented a much closer case on the issue of unity. The finding of the
Woolworth Court that a unitary business was not present was based on
the conclusion that the state court had made "specific and crucial" legal
errors in both the conclusions drawn and the legal standards applied in
analyzing the case.268
Any serious threat to the apportionment method of taxation, how-
ever, is alarming to the many states currently relying on an apportion-
ment approach.269 The apportionment method has not only been the
subject of tightening constitutional restrictions via case law, but since
1965, a continuing Congressional effort has been underway to legislate
restrictions on the use of apportionment methods by the states.2 70
While serious questions remain regarding the constitutionality of
antiapportionment legislation,27 the debate produced by the Congres-
sional proposals has revealed the basis for state concern over a possible
loss of the apportionment method.272 Multijurisdictional corporations
that have been allowed to rely upon the separate accounting method in
reporting their taxable income have provided many examples of
abuse.273 In addition, the states stand to lose a major portion of their
annual tax revenues if the apportionment method is banned by legisla-
tion or judicial decision. In California alone, the revenue loss would
total over $485 million in one year.274
The Supreme Court thus, has certainly brought home to the states
the importance ofproperly identifying when a unitary business is pres-
ent. Nevertheless, the Court has avoided every opportunity to define a
unitary business. 275 Some commentators believe this is because a "defi-
nition with such broad implications for issues not yet raised would be
improvident. 276 The ContainerCorp. decision, however, clarifies the
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Corrigan, supra note 44, at 803.
270. Dexter, State Taxation of Multinationals: Are the Mathias and Conable Bills Constitu-
tional, 14 TAx NOTES 715, 715 (1982).
271. Id
272. See id. at 715-16.
273. Cory, supra note 9,at 1137. For example "Colorado Gulf and Cities Services reported no
taxable income in 1978, despite combined sales in the state of $33.7 million" and "in 1979, Co-
noco, Amoco, Exxon, and Mobil paid state income taxes amounting to 0.3 percent, 0.4 percent, 0.9
percent, and 1.4 percent of their total corporate profits in state income taxes, respectively. These
figures are less than the rate paid by the average family of four making $16,000 [a] year." 'Id
274. Church, supra note 31, at 6.
275. Seago, supra note 1, at 104.
276. Id
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reasoning behind the-reluctance of the Court to define the concept by
stating that:
[T]he unitary business concept is not, so to speak, unitary: there are
variations on the theme, and any number of them are basically con-
sistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach. 277
State taxing authorities, therefore, are left to their own devices to arrive
at foolproof factors to guide them in identifying unitariness in various
factual circumstances." A number of factors useful in identifying a
unitary business can be distilled from the long line of apportionment
cases.279 Furthermore, factors that have stood the test of time in the
evolution of the unitary concept usually are relied upon by the states to
serve as general guidelines for recognizing when interstate business is
not divisible along state lines.28 0 This factor-selection process was ob-
servable in the California history of the apportionment method dis-
cussed earlier in this comment.2 1  A comparison of the current
California factors applied by the taxing authorities and state courts
with the factors applied inASARCO and Woolworth is illuminating as
to the viability of current state apportionment methods in light of these
1982 decisions.
A. Current Factors of Unity Applied in California
As discussed previously,28 2 California currently uses two basic tests,
often employing both tests in one case, in the search for "unity" in
interstate business:
(1) Whether or not the three unities of ownership, operation, and use
are present.
and/or
(2) Whether or not the in-state business activity contributes to, or is
dependent upon, the out-of-state business activity. 283
These tests have been expanded due to interpretation and development
by California courts and tax authorities into factors of unity, that is,
factors which tend to be present in a unitary business.
Under the unity of ownership, considered to be one factor of unitari-
ness, the FTB has stated that a corporation may be part of a unitary
group although the degree of common ownership or control is less than
277. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 6.
278. Seago, supra note 1, at 104.
279. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 479-85.
280. Id
281. See supra notes 66-110 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 66-128 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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100 percent.284 The FTB has made clear, however, that for a corpora-
tion to be included in a unitary group, the degree of common owner-
ship or control must be over 50 percent.285California case law indicates
that evenly divided ownership, combined with indirect control effected
by contractual agreement, will be viewed as control for this purpose. 286
Indirect, 287 as well as direct, ownership or control is thus viewed by
California as sufficient for meeting this test of unity. In California,
unity of ownership does not render a business unitary if the other uni-
ties are absent.288 Unity of ownership, however, did play an interesting
role in the recent California Supreme Court decision of Anaconda Co.
v. Franchise Tax Board.289 In Anaconda the ownership percentage be-
tween the domestic parent and the foreign subsidiaries was virtually
100 percent.290 Despite this fact, the taxpayer contended that the Latin
American host government of the subsidiaries had neutralized the par-
ent's nominal control by severely regulating and intervening in com-
pany operations. 29' The California Supreme Court refused to
recognize this as an offset to control for purposes of the ownership fac-
tor, stating: "Government regulations which restrict the exercise of
some familiar attributes of ownership do not establish that there was no
unity of ownership." '292 The United States Supreme Court has agreed
to review this 1982 decision and the result will be edifying in evaluating
this approach to the unity of ownership.293
In Butler, the California case that developed the unities, unity of op-
erations was said to be evidenced by the factors of centralized purchas-
ing, advertising, accounting, and management divisions.294 State tax
authorities always review centralized management in apportionment
cases.295 Centralized management is present not only when officers or
departments perform centralized management functions, but also when
interlocking directorates exist.296 The importance of this factor in-
creases as the degree of centralization increases.297 Centralized
284. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 482.
285. Id
286. See Appeal of Signal Oil & Gas Co.; (State Board of Equalization, decided Sept. 14,
1970); FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 483.
287. See Appeal of Shaffer Rentals, Inc. (State Board of Equalization, decided Sept. 14, 1970).
288. Chase Brass, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 353.




293. Id, appeal docketed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1982) (No. 82-298). In this writer's
opinion, the Supreme Court will find this "ownership" justpotential, as opposed to functional, and
thus the unity of ownership will not be found to be present in the Anaconda case.
294. Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 678, 111 P.2d at 341.
295. See FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 480.
296. Id
297. Id
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purchasing, advertising, accounting, and legal services are almost al-
ways mentioned as factors in apportionment cases.298 The reason is that
this type of functional integration is the essence of the unitary business
principle.299 In addition, the state considers such factors as shared
physical facilities, information and "know how" transfers, common in-
surance, pension and employee benefit plans, and even union bargain-
ing on a companywide basis.3" These factors are often indicative that
economies of scale are present in the interstate operations which is a
strong sign of a unitary business. 301
As noted in a earlier section,3" 2 the lack of a significant intercompany
flow of goods was once thought to be a factor compelling a conclusion
that a unitary business was not present.30 3 The United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed this position in Container Corp. by declining an invi-
tation to adopt a "bright-line rule requiring as a prerequisite to a find-
ing that a mercantile or manufacturing enterprise is unitary that it be
characterized by a 'substantial flow of goods'. ' ' 30 The basis for the de-
cision of the Court was that the "prerequisite to a constitutionally ac-
ceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of
goods."3 5 Significant intracompany product flow is, however, still a
weighty factor when found present.3°
Another factor given consideration in California is intercompany
financing.30 7 In Container Corp., financing was one of the major links
between the in-state and out-of-state activities. 08 In Container Corp.,
the California Supreme Court, basing the decision on financing and
many other factors, concluded that unity was present.30 9 As to the
financing factor, the court said, "The fact that the subsidiaries could
readily turn. . .to the parent corporation. . .for financial assistance
points toward unity. ' 310 Upon review of this state court decision, the
United States Supreme Court agreed that unity was present between
the California and the out-of-state operations of the appellant corpora-
tion.31 ' The Court noted that appellant played a substantial role in
298. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 480-81.
299. See Seago, supra note 1, at 118.
300. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 481.
301. Id
302. See supra notes 66-110 and accompanying text.
303. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 481.
304. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 17.
305. Id.
306. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 481; See Superior Oil, 60 Cal. 2d at 415, 386 P.2d at 550.
307. FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 480.




311. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 23.
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loaning funds to the subsidiaries and guaranteeing loans provided by
others, 312 and because there was no indication that these capital trans-
actions were conducted at arm's length, the resulting flow of value was
obvious.313
Additionally, California considers several more "visible" types of
factors including shared names, trade marks, patents, and processes. 314
Sharing these assets represents a companywide savings to a multijuris-
dictional corporation.315 Similarly, if a corporation hires an individual
and trains that person in the skills required in that business, that em-
ployee becomes an asset to the company. Therefore, the intercompany
transfer of personnel is a factor of unitariness. 316 Obviously this list of
factors is not exhaustive, nor is it static. In addition, the relative
weighting of the factors will shift depending on the circumstances in
each individual case.317 The mere presence or absence of one of these
factors is not itself an impressive argument that two corporations
should be considered unitary.31 8 What is important is whether or not a
particular factor enhances the economic advantage gained by a mul-
tijurisdictional corporation through interstate operations.3 1 9  The
United States Supreme Court inASARCO and Woolworth did not in-
dicate dissatisfaction with the choice of factors by the taxing states in-
volved, but the Court did express disagreement with the way those
factors were applied. Basically, the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court have not validated or invalidated specific individual factors used
by California or other states in determining unity. The ASARCO and
Woolworth decisions, however, have expressly focused the question of
constitutionality upon the question of unity.320 The following section
of this comment therefore will discuss the concept of business unity
presented in these two decisions.32'
B. Unity in ASARCO and Woolworth, A Comparison
The effect of ASARCO and Woolworth has been to refocus the due
process test for constitutionality upon the unitary business principle.
The Court reiterated the basic objective involved: "to identify situa-
312. Id. at 18.
313. Id. at 18, n. 19.






320. See generally ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. 3103; Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. 3128 (both decisions
centered around the unitary business concept).
321. See infra notes 317-333 and accompanying text.
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tions in which, because of the interdependence of operations in two or
more states, separate accounting will not result in the state's taxing its
fair share of income." '32 2 While these two decisions stressed many of the
traditional indicia of unity such as functional interdependence,323 cen-
tralized management,324 and economies of scale,325 two definitive as-
pects of the manner in which the Court used the factors should be
noted.326 First, the importance of trial courts properly establishing a
factual basis upon which the factors can be examined was emphasized.
This may be useful to the California trial courts in that the list of possi-
ble factors of unity employed by the FTB could be used by the courts
as a guide in documenting an appropriate factual basis for apportion-
ment cases. 27 Secondly, ASARCO and Woolworth have shown that
due process requirements will not be met if the unitariness of interstate
business activity is judged by looking only at such broad generaliza-
tions as "centralized management." The Court demonstrated an inten-
tion to examine the underlying business activities rather than relying
on labels of this sort. California must take care not to apply the three
unities test in this generalized manner. Some California courts seem to
weigh the various elements of the Butler test as though unitariness de-
pended upon some mathematical combination of the three elements of
the test. ASARCO and Woolworth have established that the underly-
ing economic realities must be weighed if the unitary business concept
is to support a constitutionally sufficient nexus to meet due process
requirements.328
Futhermore, the individual factors in Woolworth illustrate several
points that are enlightening when compared to the current California
approach to the unitary business concept: (1) businesses do not have to
be completely separate to avoid being classified as unitary,329 (2) dis-
tinctions by the taxing state between business and nonbusiness income
are not conclusive,330 (3) "oversight" by parent corporations of major
decisions made by subsidiary corporations may not indicate unity if
that overseeing is no more than the amount "typically given to invest-
ments in subsidiaries," '33 1 and (4)potential ownership or control does
not equate with actual ownership or control.33 2 This fourth point is




326. Seeid. at 114-18.
327. Id at 118.
328. Seeid at 117-18.
329. See Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3137-38.
330. Id at 3130, 3138.
331. Id at 3138.
332. Id at 3134.
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particularly indicative that the California approach to the concept of
unity is inadequate. The findings of the California Supreme Court in
the 1982 Anaconda case,333 regarding ownership and control as men-
tioned previously, 334 would probably be decided differently by the
United States Supreme Court based on the indication by the Court in
Woolworth that potential control is not ownership. Thus, ownership
made ineffectual by circumstances like the interference of the foreign
host government inAnaconda does not support a finding that the requi-
site unity of ownership is present.335 Nonetheless, the United States
Supreme Court in Container Corp. found that potential control, while
not dispositive of the unitary business issue, is relevant in determining
the presence of a unity of ownership.336 Potential control is relevant to
both (1) whether or not the various parts of the business share the re-
quired degree of common ownership, and (2) whether there might exist
a degree of implicit control sufficient to make the components of the
business an integrated enterprise.337
The essence of the effect of the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in ASARCO and Woolworth upon the factors of unitariness used
by California, and other states, is that these factors can have degrees.
At some "undefined point" the Court will decide that the factors are
sufficiently present to justify classification of the interstate business as
unitary.338 As discussed in the previous section, the factors of unity are
the "tools" used by the FTB and the California courts to detect the
presence of a unitary business in each set of actual circumstances. A
directive to those using the California factors of unity can be discerned
fromASARCO and Woolworth and employed as a guide to update the
state approach as follows: (1) The current California factors must be
applied by examining the underlying economic realities of the multiju-
risdictional corporation in question, as opposed to using the factors in
some abstract fashion based on broad "labels," for example, central-
ized management, and (2) The three unities test 339 and in particular,
the unity of ownership, must be applied in the context of actual rather
than potential unity.
The viability of the formulary apportionment method currently em-
ployed in California for determining the portion of total income earned
by a multijurisdictional corporation that the state can constitutionally
333. Anaconda, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 25, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
334. See supra notes 284-93 and accompanying text.
335. See generaly Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. 3128.
336. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 16, n. 16.
337. Id.
338. Seago, supra note 1, at 116.
339. Butler, 17 Cal. 2d at 678, 111 P.2d at 341.
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tax will depend upon the validity of the California unitary business
concept. While the current factors applied in California for making
this determination are similar to those used for this purpose by the
United States Supreme Court,3" the ASARCO and Woolworth opin-
ions should be reflected in the state approach to apportionment.
Significantly, in ASARCO and Woolworth the Supreme Court indi-
cated an intention not to allow unlimited expansion of the unitary busi-
ness concept as a vehicle for extension of the right of a state to tax
multijurisdictional corporations. If California does not heed this warn-
ing and narrow the state approach to the unitary business concept ac-
cordingly, the result could be that the state will face numerous
successful taxpayer challenges based on the due process guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Container Corp. made clear,
however, that future unitary tax decisions will reflect an attitude of de-
ferring to the judgment of the state courts in deciding whether a partic-
ular set of activities constitutes a unitary business.341 Deferral by the
Supreme Court to the state courts, based on the principle that the tax-
payer always bears the burden of proving that a state tax has resulted
in extraterritorial values being taxed, will be made whenever reasonably
possible 342 The general attitude of the Supreme Court with regard to
the proliferating litigation in this area of the tax law is thus best exem-
plified by the following statement from the 1983 Container Corp.
decision:
It will do the cause of legal certainty little good if this Court turns
every colorable claim that a state court erred in a particular applica-
tion of those principles [of the constitutional limits on the unitary
business concept] into a de novo adjudication, whose unintended nu-
ances would then spawn further litigation and an avalanche of criti-
cal comment. 343
The task of the Supreme Court, as indicated in Container Corp., is to
determine whether the state courts have applied the correct legal stan-
dards in analyzing the case and if they did, to decide if the state court
judgment was "within the realm of permissible judgment. ' 344
CONCLUSION
As our economy continues to grow in size and complexity, business
entities functioning within that economy will follow similar growth pat-
terns. The number of corporations conducting business activity across
340. Compare Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at 3128 with FRENTZ, supra note 2, at 479-85.
341. Container Corp., No. 81-523, slip op. at 14.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 15.
344. Id.
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state lines will continue to expand. The problem of determining the
portion of multijurisdictional corporation income apportionable to
California will become continually more vital to revenue production in
this state. After ASARCO and Woolworth, the freedom of California
and all other states using a unitary apportionment method of taxation
no longer is effectively insulated from United States Supreme Court
review. 345 Prior to these 1982 decisions, the Supreme Court had "dis-
played a remarkably relaxed view of its role in policing constitutional
challenges to state division-of-income rules. 3 46 ASA.RCO and Wool-
worth, however, reflect a "strildngly different" judicial perspective on
apportionment issues.347 The latest decision of the Court, Container
Corp., has refined and clarified the attitude of the Court regarding the
balance between the roles played by the state courts and the United
States Supreme Court in this ongoing unitary tax controversy.348 Ap-
parent from all recent cases is that a more narrow view of the unitary
business concept, emphasizing the particular facts of the case, is pres-
ently favored by the United States Supreme Court. This approach is
destined to create a sharp increase in litigation. 49 California must up-
date and refine the state factors used in effecting the unitary tax method
if the state is to be prepared for the stormy period of litigation ahead,
staying close to any changes that can be distilled from AS4RCO and
Woolworth. 350
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345. See Hellerstein, supra note 231 at 191-92.
346. Id at 187.
347. Id at 189.
Instead of a detached judicial tolerance for inferences a state is 'entitled' to draw from
the record, we find the [U.S. Supreme] Court immersing itself in the factual details of
the state administrative proceedings and rejecting state court inferences with which it
disagrees.Id
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